THE CULTURE OF REGULATION
Rodney A. Smolla*

the theories under which government may claim
the right to regulate them.
Reed Hundt, Chairman of the FCC, has grown
fond of invoking the notion of "social compact" in
discussing the obligations of broadcasters. 2 The
Chairman is doing more than playing a clever
rhetorical device here; he is invoking an entire belief structure. Western philosophy's original social compact thinkers, natural law philosophers
like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, posited that
the original condition of human beings is the
state of nature, a place where there is no law and
no security for life, liberty or property.3 The state
of nature is an ugly and violent place, a jungle of
murder and mayhem, where life is "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short."4 To escape this natural
state of terror human beings come together and
form the social compact in which individuals surrender their absolute freedom for the rule of law,
creating a sovereign that will keep order and secure the blessings of liberty.
Particularly in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes there is an inexorable quality to the social compact, an automaticity, an inevitability. We begin in
the state of nature and we move to the social compact, swept by the naturalcurrents of the universe.
The social compact will always come about because as rational beings humans we will inexorably chose security, law and order over chaos and
fear.
The invocation of the phrase "social compact"
in the context of the regulation of electronic media is, of course, not so grandiose or profound as

INTRODUCTION
The book Rationales and Rationalizations' documents well the "culture of regulation" that pervades much of the discussion of law and public
policy governing electronic media. Several philosophical and public policy impulses, doctrinal devices, and political realities have coalesced to. produce this culture. This commentary applauds
Rationales and Rationalizationsfor its critique of the
current impulse to over-regulate electronic media
and then focuses on one recent episode - the promulgation of new affirmative standards for children's educational television - as a "case study" in
the threat to the First Amendment posed by this
regulatory culture.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY
ENGINES THAT DRIVE THE CULTURE
OF REGULATION
There are a number of philosophical and policy
arguments that have recently gained popular currency that combine to form the engines that drive
the culture of regulation. These include: (1) the
metaphor of the "social compact;" (2) the ideal of
broadcasters as "public trustees;" (3) the conceptualization of broadcasters as engaged in a 'joint
venture" with government; (4) the faith that the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") exists to elevate public discourse;
(5) the proposition that the airwaves should be
used to educate children; and (6) the philosophy
that as forms of electronic media converge, so do
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spreh637.txt>).
3 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, at
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the compact that forms the origins of government, but it partakes of the same essential analytic
elements. The case for the regulation of broadcasting begins with a "state of nature" argument.
The natural laws of physics produce scarcity in the
electro-magnetic spectrum. Without governmental rules to assign frequencies and licenses on the
spectrum, it is reduced to the chaos of a war of all
against all. 5 The Federal Communications Commission may be seen to exist by necessity, as part of
the natural order, as inevitable as governmental
itself if human beings are to behave rationally.
Once the electro-magnetic spectrum was discovered and invention made it exploitable, the need
for the imposition of the rule of law was self-evident.
If the basic need for a social compact governing
use of the electro-magnetic spectrum was self-evident, however, the terms of that compact were not.
A stark, minimalist compact would require little
more than the assignment of frequencies. However the frequencies were assigned, whether by
auction or governmental grant, and whether they
would exist in perpetuity or for limited terms,
such a minimalist contract would require very little ongoing supervision by government. The only
significant governmental task would be to police
encroachment by users into parts of the spectrum
not assigned to them. A Federal Communications
Commission would not be necessary to do this
job; it could be assigned to a cadre of "frequency
police," perhaps located in a special division of
the FBI.
Our history, however, has been otherwise. We
have embarked on a more elaborate social compact, one in which valuable frequencies are given
away by the government licensees, who in return
sign on to a regime of laws that impose a number
of restrictions on the content of speech that may
be broadcast, as well as several broad and gauzy
affirmative obligations. Broadcasters are perceived as "public trustees," with affirmative responsibilities to broadcast in the "public interest."
5
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76
(1969).
6 CORN-REVERE, supra note 1.
7 In FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the
Supreme Court decided a case arising from the broadcast of
a satiric 12-minute comedy monologue by George Carlin, entitled "Filthy Words." Carlin made fun of the "words you
can't say on the airwaves" by discussing them in endless
comic permutations. The FCC ruled that Carlin's routine
was indecent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which forbids
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In its most extreme manifestations, this notion
of the broadcaster as public trustee seems to contemplate that government and broadcasters are
participants in an ambitious joint venture, a venture aimed at elevating public discourse, educating
children and enlightening political debate. The
FCC exists not merely to rescue us from the physical chaos of an unregulated spectrum; it exists to
secure a more profound redemption. The FCC
will regulate the marketplace of ideas in order to
save it. One at times gets the sense that deep in
the soul of the contemporary FCC there resides a
hope that springs eternal: that someday all television would look like PBS.
There is a ratchet mechanism at work in the
culture of regulation. Each regulatory step provides momentum for the next one. Out of the
need for physical space regulation sprang a
claimed right to regulate content. Out of the
need to regulate the broadcast spectrum sprang a
claimed right to regulate other forms of electronic communication, such as computer communication over the Internet. As forms of media
converge so do regulatory theories. If we have an
FCC for radio and television, why not for communication on-line?
THE DOCTRINAL DEVICES USED TO
JUSTIFY THE CULTURE OF REGULATION
The philosophical and policy impulses that
nourish the culture of regulation require legal
doctrines to justify them. The doctrines that have
been prominent in recent debates include: (1)
the claim that many forms of current "regulation"
are nothing but "voluntarism" by players in the
private sector, such as broadcasters agreeing to air
a specified number of educational children's programs;6 (2) the argument that the doctrines emanating from FCC v. Pacifica7 apply to media other
than broadcasting;" (3) the argument that the
doctrines emanating from FCC v. Pacificaapply to
areas of speech other than "indecency;" (4) the
the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communications." A divided Supreme Court
affirmed the Commission. A majority of the Court agreed
that the First Amendment rules governing the content regulation of broadcasting were less stringent than those governing print media. The Court was divided, however, on the
rationale for this holding, as well as the contours of the type
of "indecent speech" that could be kept off the airwaves.
8 In 1987, the FCC first suggested that broadcasters
should no longer assume that it was safe to broadcast inde-
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claim that special First Amendment rules apply
anytime government acts for the well-being of
children; (5) the assertion that rules aimed at requiring warnings, labels, ratings, and disclosures
all enhance First Amendment values by placing
adding to the information available in the marketplace of ideas; (6) the claim that many forms of
regulation merely "empower" consumers, particularly parents, to make intelligent choices in the
marketplace; and (7) the assertion that specific
governmental regulatory standards promote First
Amendment values by employing precisionin regulation, a positive value that reduces the chilling effect on speech by reducing uncertainty.
The Supreme Court provided some doctrinal
momentum to the culture of regulation in its
hopelessly inscrutable decision last term in Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc., v. FCC.9 In Denver Area the Supreme Court
struck down two sections and upheld one section
of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992. 1o The decision was
highly splintered, with Justice Breyer announcing
the judgment of the Court. Some parts of his
opinion carried a majority of Justices, others a
plurality, and a total of six Justices issued opinions. By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that the provisions of the law which permit cable operators to
refuse to air indecent programming (defined as
"sexually explicit" or "patently offensive" material) on "public access channels" violated the First
Amendment. (Public access channels are chan-

nels that, over the years, local governments have
required cable system operators to set aside for
public, educational, or governmental purposes as
part of the consideration an operator gives in return for permission to install cables under city
streets and to use public rights-of-way.) In contrast, by a vote of 7-2, the Court upheld sections of
the Act allowing cable operators to refuse indecent programming on "leased access channels,"
which are paid for by independent programmers.
(A leased channel is a channel that federal law requires a cable system operator to reserve for commercial lease by unaffiliated third parties. About
ten to fifteen percent of a cable system's channels
would typically fall into this category.) The Justices found that the term "indecent" was not unconstitutionally vague and that the leased access
provisions were constitutionally appropriate
means of addressing the interest in protecting
children from indecent material and balancing
the relative interests of cable operators and programmers. Finally, by a vote of 6-3, the Court
held unconstitutional the provisions of the law
that require cable operators to place indecent material on leased access channels on segregated
channels that are initially "blocked," requiring the
customer to have them un-blocked by filing a written request.
Justice Breyer made a number of relatively
loose statements in Denver Area that are particularly troubling with regard to the question of the
government's power to regulate electronic media

cent material anytime after 10 p.m. Infinity Broad. Corp. of
Pa., 3 FCC Rec. 930 (1987) In its review of this decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the FCC's definition of indecency was not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, but, troubled with the reliability of certain data relied upon by the Commission, vacated
several portions of the FCC's order. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("ACT I").
Two months after the decision in ACT I, Congress instructed
the Commission to promulgate regulations enforcing the obscenity and indecency provisions of § 1464 on a 24-hour per
day basis. Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228
(1988). The Commission complied by issuing a regulation
banning all broadcasts of indecent material. The Court of
Appeals reviewed the 24-hour ban and struck it down. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) ("ACT II"). The Supreme Court declined review.
Congress then intervened again, passing the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949.
Section 16(a) of the Act provides that, with one exception,
indecent materials may only be broadcast between the hours
of midnight and 6 a.m. Id. at § 16(a). The exception permitted public radio and television stations that go off the air at
or before midnight to broadcast such materials after 10 p.m.

In the third round of appellate review, the Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, upheld the restrictions. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
("Act III"). In Act III, the court found that the government
has a compelling interest in protecting children under the
age of 18 from exposure to indecent broadcasts. The court
was satisfied that, standing alone, the "channeling" of indecent broadcasts to the hours between midnight and 6 a.m.
would not unduly burden the First Amendment. The court
also found, however, that the distinction drawn by Congress
between certain public broadcasters that go off the air early
and commercial broadcasters did not bear any apparent relationship to the compelling governmental interests that section 16(a) was intended to serve, and thus held the more restrictive limitation unconstitutional. The court therefore
remanded the cases to the FCC with instructions to revise its
regulations to permit the broadcasting of indecent material
between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. The Supreme
Court denied review. This then serves as the model for the
proposal to limit beer advertising to the hours of 10 p.m. to 6
a.m.
9 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
10 Id.; Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1486.
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to protect children. Justice Breyer thus spoke approvingly of Pacifica, and noted that protecting
children from exposure to patently offensive sexrelated material was an "extremely important"
and a "compelling" justification.I1
It is difficult to decipher what the Denver
Area case portends. Because it is a case dealing
with sexual material, it may well be possible to
cabin the decision within the narrow Pacifica line
of cases. The Denver Area decisions does seem to
signal, however, that there is a great deal of fluidity on the current Supreme Court with regard to
issues concerning electronic media and children,
a fluidity than only encourages the culture of regulation.
POLITICAL REALITIES THAT DRIVE
THE CULTURE OF REGULATION
Sigmund Freud claimed that all behavior is
over-determined, and that presumably applies to
political behavior as much as any other. There
are probably many political factors that make the
climate today hospitable to the culture of regulation. One political reality of the day, however,
strikes me as especially significant: the success of
the Bill Clinton centrist strategy to co-opt much of
the Republican Party's appeal to family values by
an agenda that emphasizes making the world of
electronic communication friendly to children. 12
The Democrats played their family values hand
brilliantly, and their trump card was protecting
kids from bad speech - on television and on the
Internet, and in the form of sheltering them from
excesses of violence, sex, and bad habits such as
smoking and drinking.13 One interesting and
largely uncharted constitutional question is the
extent to which "deals" brokered by the White
II Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
CORN-REVERE, supra note 1.

12

13 Some might argue that a second political reality of importance is the changing face of the communications industry. As the corporate ownership of the major broadcast and
cable companies has changed, some may believe, so has the
willingness to work with the government on social policies
such as protecting kids. Thus it is sometimes claimed that to
many of the new owners of major broadcast and cable media,
freedom of speech and editorial autonomy are not the values
they used to be. Good public relations and good governmental relations are becoming more important than stubborn independence. I do not know how to evaluate this argument; I
suspect that there is still a great deal of contrariness and First
Amendment spunk left in the communications industry, but
it is, as it probably always has been, blended with a healthy
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House pressuring broadcasters to acquiesce in
some forms of regulation might themselves violate
the First Amendment. 14
A CASE STUDY IN THE CULTURE OF
REGULATION: CHILDREN'S TELEVISION
Rationales and Rationalizationsdoes an excellent
job of mapping out the primary lines of attack on
the culture of regulation. I wish to take one specific recent example of the triumph of the culture
of regulation - the FCC's promulgation of standards for educational children's television - and
use it as a lesson in how the culture of regulation
works, and how it might be countered in ajudicial
attack.15
The FCC launched its new approach to improving the quality of children's educational programming by issuing a Notice of ProposedRulemakinga6 in
which it proposed to take one of three courses of
action: (1) the monitoring of broadcasted programming specifically designed to serve the educational needs of children to determine if there is
a significant increase in such programming; (2)
establishment of a safe harbor quantitative
processing guideline for children's educational
programming; or (3) promulgation of a programming standard setting forth a specified average
number of hours for children's educational programming. These alternatives were in turn
anchored by a proposed definition of "core" educational programming setting forth requirements
for the design, purpose, hours, scheduling regularity, programming length and identifying information that such programming must contain.
Broadcasters at first fought the proposed actions
vigorously, but in August 1996, pushed hard by
pressure from the White House, the broadcasters
dose of economic pragmatism.
14
In Writers Guild v. FCC, the court held unconstitutional
a plan that arose when the FCC pressured the National Association of Broadcasters into accepting a plan that would
place program material unsuitable for children after 9 p.m.
and be accompanied by warnings. Writers Guild v. FCC, 423
F. Supp 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
15
I opposed the FCC's new proposals for children's television, and filed a statement on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters arguing against the Commission proposals, echoing the views expressed in this commentary.
16 In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming; Revision of Programming Policies for
Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

10 FCC Rcd. 6308 (1995).
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I submit, however, that to the extent that the
Commission's proposals are motivated by the
judgment that "you can't ... get this kind of programming unless you oblige it," they were predicated on a governmental interest that, as a matter
of law, was not a permissible basis for FCC regulation.
"At the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for him
or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."' 9 This
is not some featherweight precept floating on the
periphery of First Amendment doctrine, but a
core constitutional principle; government action
"that requires the utterance of a particular
message favored by the Government, contravenes

this essential right."20 Indeed, in Turner Broadcasting the Supreme Court sternly instructed that
such laws "pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion
ratherthan persuasion."21
Now it must be conceded that the Commission's proposals for enhancing children's television were not an attempt at censorship in the
traditional sense. The Commission clearly was
not attempting to "suppress unpopular ideas or
information." However, the Commission was
quite unabashedly considering strategies that "manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion." This is something the
Commission should not have been permitted to
do under the First Amendment
First Amendment principles do not permit the
FCC to exercise at-large authority to regulate the
programming of broadcasters for the purpose of
correcting perceived deficiencies in the programming generated by broadcasters within the environment of the competitive commercial marketplace. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the regime of Red Lion does not
grant the Commission carte blanche over the programming choices of broadcasters. "Government
regulation over the content of broadcast programming must be narrow, and that broadcast licensees must retain abundant discretion over programming choices." 22
Pointedly, the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting specifically rejected the "market dysfunction" justification for the regulation of broadcasters. In direct response to the Government's
argument in Turner that the foundations for the
Red Lion standard of review are not the physical
limitations of the electro-magnetic spectrum but
rather the alleged "market dysfunction" of the

Paul Farhi, Broadcasters Pledge 3 Hours of "Educational"
TV a Week, WASH. PosT, July 30, 1996, at Al. Broadcasters
agreed to a compromise plan whereby stations must air three
hours per week of "educational" programming. Stations that
air less than three hours per week of regularly scheduled programming may offer an equivalent amount by running specials and public-service announcements or by financing education programs that air on other stations. Broadcasters that
fall below the standard would have to justify their programming choices to the Commission.
18 This rationale was been forcefully advanced as the
predicate for the Commission's proposals by Chairman Reed
Hundt in numerous speeches and interviews. See Don Oldenburg, Tuning in the Future of Kids' TV WASH. POST, Sept. 12,

1995, at B5 ("'You can't expect in the normal workings of the
marketplace to get this kind of programming unless you
oblige it,' says FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, who has championed the proposal for new rules that would require commercial networks to schedule a minimum of high-quality and innovative children's educational shows and is actively seeking
the public's support for it.").
19 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994).
20 Id.
21
Id. (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 651 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378-80 (1984)); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126 (1973).

and the Commission reached a deal agreeing to
acceptance of minimal children's programming
requirements.' 7
Now it is very difficult to argue without embarrassment against governmental regulations aimed
at enhancing children's programming. Nobody is
going to take the position that we need poorer
quality children's programming. If there is a case
to be made against what the FCC did with regard
to children's television, it must be not the goal
but the method that is attacked, the method of
using governmental power and leverage to exact
concessions from the private sector.
We should begin by laying out with greater
specificity the philosophical impulses that lead to
the Commission's original proposals. All are familiar themes in the culture of regulation. The
proposals were driven by the judgment that economic market forces operate to deter broadcasters from providing what the Commission believed
was sufficient educational programming for children. Broadcasters thus had to be forced more
directly through regulation to provide additional
programming. "
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broadcast market, the Supreme Court sharply replied that "the special physical characteristics of
broadcast transmissions, not the economic characteristics of the broadcast market, are what underlies our broadcast jurisprudence." 2 3
The current First Amendment standard governing broadcast regulation, as distilled in FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 24 is that a regulation will
be upheld only when "the restriction is narrowly
tailored to further a substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced
coverage of public issues."2 5 In applying this standard, a standard grounded exclusively in the spectrum scarcity rationale emanating from Red Lion,
the Supreme Court has never countenanced government regulations that impose specifically defined affirmative programming requirements on
broadcasters. To the contrary, the First Amendment "window" opened by Red Lion and its progeny has been limited to regulations aimed narrowly at ensuring equality of access in public
debate and the channeling of indecent programming. 26 No matter how vigorously the Commission may disclaim any intent to become a federal
"Office of the Censor," the inevitable regulatory
response of specific program requirements will be
program-by-program review of the content of
children's offerings aired by broadcasters, to determine if those programs meet the definition imposed by the Commission. Specific programming
requirements are senseless without specific regulatory enforcement. Such program-by-program
review would mark a fundamental shift in the philosophy governing broadcast regulation at odds
with statutory limitations, prior Court sanctioned
Commission practice, and core First Amendment
principles.
The spectrum scarcity rationale upon which
First Amendment doctrine governing the contentbased regulation of broadcasting is currently
grounded does not provide the Commission with
plenary power to impose its views of wise social
policy on the programming choices of broadcasters. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
drawn a sharp distinction between potential regulatory schemes. On the one hand are regulations
23 Turner, 512 U.S. at 640 (1994) (citing League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 377); FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
24
25

468 U.S. 364 (1984).
Id. at 380.
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implemented to ensure reasonable balance and
access equity in the presentation of views on issues
of public concern or the political process. Regulations that intrude on the independence and discretion of broadcasters, particularly in the selection of actual programming sources, are markedly
distinct. Thus the Court has observed that
"although the Government's interest in ensuring
balanced coverage of public issues is plainly both
important and substantial, we have, at the same
time, made clear that broadcasters are engaged in
a vital and independent form of communicative
activity."2 7
Because of spectrum scarcity, the Supreme
Court has instructed the Commission to require a
degree of balance and access in the presentation
of diverse views on public controversies and elections. However, spectrum scarcity does not justify
turning broadcasters into common carriers, or
subjecting broadcasters to specific governmental
mandates with regard to particular types of programming. In those cases in which the Court has
permitted regulation under the balance and access rationales, it has heavily emphasized the limited scope of such incursions. When the Court
sustained a right of access for federal candidates,
for example, it noted that this was a "limited right
to 'reasonable' access."2 8 The Court noted that
this right that did "not impair the discretion of
broadcasters to present their views on any issue or
29
to carry any particulartype of programming,"
The Court has referred to this tension between
the obligations of broadcasters and their independence as members of a free press in our constitutional system as a "tightrope" calling for "delicate
balancing":
This role of the Government as an "overseer"
and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public
interest and the role of the licensee as ajournalistic "free agent" call for a delicate balancing of
competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than forty years has called on both
the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightrope" to preserve the First Amendment values
written into the Radio Act and its successor, the
Communications Act.3 0
26
27

28
29
30

(1973).

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 22.
League of Women Voters of CaL, 468 U.S. at 378.
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
CBS v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
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"In particular, the FCC's oversight responsibilities do
not grant it the power to ordain any particular type of
programming that must be offered by broadcast stations; for although 'the Commission may inquire of
licensees what they have done to determine the needs
of the community they propose to serve, the Commission may not impose upon them its private notions of
what the public ought to hear."' 3 4

Following the general trend of the current culture of regulation, the FCC lost its constitutional
balance and fell off the tightrope with its children's television rules.
If the FCC's approach to children's television
were challenged in court, the Commission would
be hard pressed to reconcile its rules with a
number of statements made by the Supreme
Court in Turner Broadcasting.
In the critical passage of the Turner Broadcasting
opinion, the Court began with the concession
"that broadcast programming, unlike cable programming, is subject to certain limited content restraints imposed by statute and FCC regulation."
s1 In a footnote the Court then cited, as its first
illustration, the Children's Television Act, which
it characterized as "directing [the] FCC to consider extent to which license renewal applicant
has 'served the educational and informational
needs of children.' "32 It is worth underscoring
that by this characterization, the Court clearly understood the Commission's statutory authority as
limited to consideration of the extent to which
licensees have satisfied this obligation as part of
the license renewal process. Far more importantly, the Court then went on to explain, in quite
sweeping terms, the jurisprudential principles
that constrain the Commission's power to regulate the content of broadcasting. In this decisive
segment of its opinion, the Court observed that
the argument against must-carry "exaggerates the
extent to which the FCC is permitted to intrude
into matters affecting the content of broadcast
programming."3 3 This exaggerated characterization of the FCC's authority, the Court explained,
failed to take into account the doctrine that the
FCC may not prescribe any particulartype of programming that must be offered by broadcast stations. The Commission may in license renewal inquire as to what licensees have done to meet their
statutory obligations, but it may not through rule
impose programming requirements:

In these passages, the Court was thus underscoring a long-standinglimitation, a limitation that
Congress has understood and endorsed and,
more importantly, that Congress, the Commission, and the courts have all previously understood as undergirded by limitations in the First
Amendment itself. Indeed, in describing these
limits on FCC authority, the Court in Turner
Broadcasting quoted liberally from the Commission's own prior acknowledgments that more intrusive regulation would violate First Amendment
principles.36
Chairman Hundt has suggested that specific
programming standards would actually enhance
First Amendment values, citing the general First
Amendment doctrine favoring precise over vague
standards. 3 This argument, however, is sleight
of hand, for it invokes the precision principle entirely out of context, and in so doing turns existing First Amendment doctrine upside down.

31
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 649
(1996) (emphasis supplied).
32
Id. at 649 n.7.
3s
Id. at 650.
34 Id., quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and
Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293 (1960).
35
Turner, 512 U.S. at 651 quoting En Banc Programming
Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2312 (1960).
36
Turner, 512 U.S. at 651(1994) ("The FCC is well aware
of the limited nature of its jurisdiction, having acknowledged
that it "has no authority and, in fact, is barred by the First

Amendment and [§ 326] from interfering with the free exercise of journalistic judgment." quoting Hubbard Broad., 48
F.C.C.2d 517, 520 (1974)). See also Turner, 512 U.S. at 651
("The FCC itself has recognized that 'a more rigorous standard for public stations would come unnecessarily close to
impinging on First Amendment rights and would run the collateral risk of stifling the creativity and innovative potential of
these stations." quoting Public Broad., 98 F.C.C.2d 746, 751
(1982)).
37 Chairman Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigmfor Broadcast
Regulation, Address at the Conference for the Second Cen-

Not content to let matters rest there, the Court
then made its point a second time, using as its example the limitations on the Commission's authority over noncommercial educational stations.
The Court's discussion on this issue is particularly
relevant to the current proceedings, for the Court
was parsing the statutory and constitutional confines of the Commission's authority to define educationalprogramming:
"What is important for present purposes, however, is
that noncommercial licensees are not required by statute or regulation to carry any specific quantity of "educational" programming or any particular "educational"
programs. Noncommercial licensees, like their commercial counterparts, need only adhere to the general
requirement that their programming serve "the public
5
interest, convenience or necessity."3
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casting, spoke eloquently of the centrality of this
autonomy principle in our First Amendment tradition:

When government is engaging in negative regulation, proscribing certain speech and establishing
penalties for its utterance, doctrines such as "overbreadth" and "vagueness" do work to require precision in drafting.38 Similarly, laws that presume
to restrict speech must be precisely tailored,
sweeping no more broadly than necessary to effectuate the government's purposes. 3 But these
First Amendment axioms have never been applied
in the opposite direction: there is simply no such
thing as a requirement that government act precisely when ordering speakers what to say, because
the very notion of ordering speakers to speak to
suit the government's purposes is antithetical to
free speech. The premise of the Chairman's argument is thus profoundly flawed; the precision
principle, designed to protect speakers from government overreaching, cannot be invoked to aid
and abet it. The Supreme Court's many ringing
pronouncements that the government may not
impose obligations on speakers to speak certain
messages pleasing to the government are not
magically mooted merely because the government
is careful to be precise in its marching orders.
Indeed, when the government is enforcing affirmative obligations to speak, the greater the
specificity, the greater the offense. This independence and autonomy of speakers under our constitutional system to decide for themselves what to
say and what not to say is a universal theme in
First Amendment jurisprudence, cutting across
various forms of media and subject matter. 4 0
Most recently, in Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,4 1 the
Supreme Court, drawing heavily on TurnerBroad-

In short, the spectrum scarcity rationale endorsed in Red Lion grants the government limited
authority to impose on broadcast licensees a narrowly circumscribedobligation to present contesting
viewpoints. But it does not authorize government
to impose on licensees any obligation to present
certain kinds of programming beyond these limited requirements of balanced public debate,
however enlightened the government's purposes
may be.4 3 The Commission's rules dictate to
broadcasters significant elements of the mix and
makeup of their programming schedules. This
use of the government's power "violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to
choose the content of his own message." 44
Finally, a point should be made about constitutional alternatives to the Commission's proposals.
The worthy goal of encouraging high-quality chil-

tury of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Sept. 21,
1995) (transcript available on-line, (visited April 22, 1997)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/Spreh528.txt>)
[hereinafter New ParadigmSpeech].
38
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)
(overbreadth); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(vagueness).
39 Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989).
40
See e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (commercial speech case striking
down forced inclusion of messages of others, noting that "all
speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to
leave unsaid"); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comrt'n, 115 S.
Ct. 1511, 1516, 1519 (1995) (striking down ban on anonymous campaign literature, emphasizing First Amendment
right of speakers to make their own "decisions concerning
omissions or additions to the content of a publication," and
to choose for themselves what to "include or exclude"); Turner Broad., 512 U.S. 622, 650 (noting that "the FCC's over-

sight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any
particular type of programming"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("However, where the State's interest is
to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such
message.").
41
115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
42 Id. at 2350 (citations omitted). As eloquent as this
statement would have been in any Supreme Court opinion,
its force is accentuated for the purposes of these proceedings
by the fact that the Court in Hurley drew extensively from
Turner Broadcastingto support its holding. Hurley, 115 S. Ct.
at 2848-50.
43
See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110
(1973) ("Congress intended to permit private broadcasting
to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent
with its public obligations.").
44
Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.

"Our tradition of free speech commands that a speaker
who takes to the street corner to express his views in
this way should be free from interference by the State
based on the content of what he says .... The very idea
that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some
groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First
Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis .

..

. While the law is free to promote all sorts of

conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
either purpose may strike
one, however enlightened
42
the government.
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dren's programming can be pursued most directly and effectively by the government if it simply funds such programming, through support of
PBS, the NEA or other entities that financially
contribute to the creation and production of children's programming. On this score, I fully support the views of Professor Cass Sunstein, who
proposes such increased funding as a desirable reform. 45 Chairman Hundt has cited the views of
Professor Sunstein in support of the Commission's current proposals. 46 But with sincere respect, where Chairman Hundt and Professor Sunstein go wrong is in taking the next step, which
assumes that the Commission may, vigorously enforce the Children's Television Act in a manner
that imposes specific affirmative programming requirements on broadcasters in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. 47
The impulse for this second step is understandable - in today's political climate it may well be
that Congress is highly unlikely to increase the
funding for public broadcasting or the arts, and
therefore the temptation exists to attempt to accomplish through regulatory fiat what cannot be
obtained through congressional subsidy. The
First Amendment, however, stands squarely in the
way.
The Commission's proposals partake of a philosophical view that permeates much of the writings
of Professor Sunstein and the speeches of Chairman Hundt: that the government may regulate
public discourse in order to elevate it. Under this
view, the government should play an affirmative
role in elevating public debate and discussion and
may use its regulatory powers to that purpose.
Moreover, this is not seen as creating tensions

with the First Amendment, because, under this
philosophy, the purpose of the First Amendment
is to enhance public deliberation and self-governance. This is a classic and oft-repeated theme in
scholarly discussion about the First Amendment.48 But while this view states a respectable intellectual position on what some believe the First
Amendment ought to be, it certainly does not accurately describe the First Amendment as it is.
Listening to Chairman Hundt or Professor Sunstein, the broadcast world sounds as if it should all
look like NPR or PBS. But the First Amendment
does not play such favorites. The New York Post enjoys the same constitutional protections as The
New York Times, Entertainment Tonight as the MacNeil, Lehrer News Hour and Mighty Morphin Power
Rangers as Sesame Street. While political speech is
certainly at the "core" of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the
First Amendment protects the emotional content
of speech as well as the cognitive, the entertaining
as well as the informing.4 9
The impulse to improve the quality of children's educational and informational programming is laudable.50 Drawing on this commendable impulse, Chairman Reed Hundt recently
advanced the view that the Commission's current
proposals regarding children's programming do
not run afoul of the First Amendment. The
Chairman's theme was that the law sometimes
does infringe on the natural freedom citizens enjoy in the open marketplace, particularly in the
interest of protecting the interests of families and
children; thus zoning laws restrict land uses in residential neighborhoods, and safety laws require
children to wear motorcycle helmets.5 1

45
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
FREE SPEECH 84 (1st ed., The Free Press) (1993).

expression or comment on public affairs, essential as those
are to healthy government."); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (the protections of
the First Amendment "are not confined to any field of
human interest."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) ("We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech,
has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of
the overall message sought to be communicated.").
50 There are extant today a growing number of eloquent
pleas for more creative educational programming. See
Newton N. Minow & Craig L. LaMay, ABANDONED IN THE

OF

New ParadigmSpeech, supra note 37.
supra note 45, at 84-85.
48 Among its most famous adherents is Judge Robert
Bork. See Robert Bork, NeutralPrinciples and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
49 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)
("We do not [agree] that the constitutional protection for a
free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with
instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine."); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("The importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to
inform."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
46

47

SUNSTEIN,

WASTELAND (1995).
51
See Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Long Live Frieda Hennock, Address at the Women in Government Relations Conference (August 24, 1995) (transcript available at FCC)
("Notwithstanding First Amendment challenges, courts have
repeatedly held that government can require certain
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The philosophical view advanced by the Chairman is appropriate for vast areas of American economic and social life. Our Constitution and our
traditions of governance do not require blind
faith in the efficacy of the free market. Experience has taught us that laws often are necessary to
protect the quality of life in residential neighborhoods or children from head injuries in motorcycle accidents. Yet, the Chairman's philosophy has
been roundly rejected in matters dealing with
freedom of expression. When the First Amendment is implicated, paternalism is the exception,
not the rule. The regulation of freedom of expression is not the same as the regulation of land use
or safety helmets. To repeat the Supreme Court's
recent admonition, "[w] hile the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for
no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the
government." 5 2 Although the First Amendment,
at present, may countenance such narrow regulation of the content of broadcasting as the inde-

cency proscriptions upheld in Pacifica,it has never,
even in the special sphere of broadcasting, been
understood to permit the government to commandeer the speech rights of independent speakers, forcing them to produce messages the government deems socially desirable. 5
The government is not powerless in this matter.
The Children's Television Act does impose obligations on broadcasters, and the Commission is directed to treat those obligations seriously during
license renewal proceedings. The Commission
may use its persuasive powers, and the Chairman
the bully pulpit, to cajole broadcasters and encourage more innovative children's programming. And ultimately, of course, if the government perceives deficiencies in the offerings of the
marketplace, it may enter the market itself to sell
its own wares.5 4 The government may directly or
indirectly subsidize the creation and broadcast of
high-quality children's programming. But what
the First Amendment does not permit is for government to pursue its objectives through the simple expedient of fiat.

magazines on open newsstands to be in brown paper wrappers. Government can zone certain kinds of stores away from
residential neighborhoods. Government can require kids on
motorcycles to wear safety helmets. The FCC can forbid radio and television shows from broadcasting indecent material
until after 10 p.m., when almost all kids are or should be in
bed. None of these actions are inconsistent with the First
Amendment and reasonable steps to use the airwaves in a
real, specific concrete way to provide public interest programs are also not barred by the First Amendment.").
52
Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group
of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2350 (1995).
53
See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (striking
down "highly paternalistic" advertising restrictions); Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 790-91
(1988) ("[t]he State's remaining justification - the paternalistic premise that charities' speech must be regulated for
their own benefit - is equally unsound. The First Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the government, know best both what they want to say and how to
say it." (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 224 (1987))). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.

Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-792, and n.31 (1978) (criticizing
State's paternalistic interest in protecting the political process by restricting speech by corporations); Linmark Assocs.
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (criticizing, in the
commercial speech context, the State's paternalistic interest
in maintaining the quality of neighborhoods by restricting
speech to residents). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The very purpose of
the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from
assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion."). See also West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.").
54 See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Scalia, J.) ("Nor does any case suggest that 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate' consists of debate from
which the government is excluded, or an 'uninhibited marketplace of ideas' one in which the government's wares cannot be advertised.").

